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LAWYERS AND CHILDREN: WISDOM AND
LEGITIMACY IN FAMILY POLICY
Carl E. Schneider*
IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN: ADVOCACY, LAW REFORM, AND
PUBLIC POLICY. By Robert H. Mnookin, Robert A. Burt, David L.

Chambers, Michael S. Wald, Stephen D. Sugarman, Franklin E. Zimring, and Rayman L. Solomon. New York: W.H. Freeman & Co.
1985. Pp. xii, 572. Cloth, $22.95; paper, $15.95.
In the Interest of Children is a fine book. It is a fine book because it
embodies an admirable idea and executes it ably. Its fault, if it has one,
lies in doing so excellently what it does that it cannot do a little more.
To entice you to read In the Interest of Children, I will summarize it,
criticize it briefly, and then discuss its themes.
,
I.

WHAT DOES THE BOOK SAY?

The Introduction
The book's admirable idea is to answer the question whether "testcase litigation [is] a sensible way to promote the welfare of children"
(p. ix) by anatomizing five examples of test-case litigation, not just in
terms of their doctrinal bases and implications, but also by investigating how they came to be litigated; what tactical, ethical, social, and
institutional issues they raised and how they resolved them; and what
social and legal consequences they had. Professor Robert H.
Mnookin, of the Stanford Law School, provides an extensive introduction which describes the setting and importance of these questions and
proposes ways of addressing them. He begins by emphasizing the special difficulties of making policy for children:
Two fundamental problems typically confront a policymaker trying
to make a rational decision about the best interests of children. The first,
the predictlon problem, is that it is often exceedingly difficult to predict
the consequences of alternative children's policies. The second, the value
problem, arises from the difficulty of selecting the criteria that should be
used to evaluate the alternative consequences. [pp. 16-17; emphasis in
original]

Professor Mnookin suggests the prediction and the value problems are
so frequent and severe that "easy cases are the exception, not the rule"
(p. 24). The identity of the decisionmaker thus becomes crucial. Since
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this book studies test-case litigation, it investigates the role of the
judge not just in deciding cases, but in writing policy. The power of
American judges to make public policy was exemplified and made glorious by Brown v. Board of Education. 1 Yet how far judges should
write policy, Professor Mnoo1dn notes, depends on their capacity and
on the legitimacy of their power:
The capacity question is essentially a practical issue: is the adversarial
process oflitigation an effective way to make sound policy decisions and
create and enforce remedies? The legitimacy issue poses a fundamental
question of political theory: can policymaking by courts in a democracy
be squared with majority rule and popular control? [p. 25]

Professor Mnookin shows how these two questions of judicial authority interact with the prediction and value problems to make test-case
litigation about children specially troubling. He cites, for example, the
indeterminacy of the constitutional status of children, the uncertainty
whether children's political powerlessness justifies judicial activism on
their behalf, and the disagreement over what policies any such activism should prefer.
Professor Mnookin argues that the role of the child's lawyer is
hardly less problematic than the role of the judge: "Children need advocates because, in most circumstances, young persons cannot speak
for and defend their own interests. And yet, because children often
cannot define their own interests, how can the advocate know for certain what those interests are?" (p. 43). Not only can lawyers for children not rely on clients to define their own interests; lawyers in testcase litigation represent whole classes of children whose interests may
conflict. The lawyer thus has both the benefit of an unfettered choice
of policies to advocate for children and the burden of making that
choice.

The Case Studies
Professor Mnookin's introduction having posed the problem of
test-case litigation for children, the book embarks on its five case studies. Because these are intrinsically interesting, because they are the
heart of the book, and because I will shortly attempt to generalize
about them, they deserve to be summarized here.
The first case study is of Smith v. Organization of Foster Families
for Equality and Reform (OFFER) 2 and is by Professor David L.
Chambers, of the University of Michigan Law School, and Professor
Michael S. Wald, of the Stanford Law School. OFFER began with a
real client, Madeleine Smith, who had a real problem - that childwelfare authorities in New York City wished to remove her foster children from her home. Ms. Smith persuaded Marcia Lowry, a lawyer
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
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with the Children's Rights Project of the New York Civil Liberties
Union, to represent her and her foster children. Ms. Lawry's complaint argued that foster pare:µts who have cared for a child for at least
a year have a constitutionally protected interest in the child such that
he may not be moved (even to be returned to his natural parents) without a prior hearing more complete than those then provided for by
New York State and New York City. Louise Gans, a lawyer on the
staff of Community Action for Legal Services, intervened on behalf of
the class of natural parents with children in foster care; Helen Buttenwieser, a lawyer whose clients included private agencies that handled foster care, was appointed by the three-judge district court to
represent the class of foster children. After a one-day trial, the court
held that foster children have a constitutional right to a hearing before
a transfer, that the foster parents could not waive the right, and that
therefore such a hearing must precede any transfer. The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that it did not have to decide whether foster
parents and children have a constitutionally protected interest in their
relationship because New York's procedures already met the standard
of due process required where such an interest is governmentally
infringed.
Doctrinally, OFFER was anti-climactic. Practically, OFFER had
some immediate effects: Early in the litigation, the authorities decided
not to remove Ms. Smith's foster children; later in the litigation New
York City (but not New York State) instituted formal hearings for
foster children being transferred to another foster home. Ultimately,
however, Professors Chambers and Wald conclude that
the new rules do not appear to have brought substantial change to the
system either directly or by inspiring changes elsewhere. . . . Each year
since 1975, there have been more than one thousand ... transfers, but,
for only twenty or thirty of them were hearings held. It is nonetheless
true that in about 45 percent of the hearings that are held, the agency
decision is reversed. [p. 115]
In the Interest of Children's second case study is of Bellotti v. Baird

and is by Professor Mnookin. In 1974, Massachusetts enacted a law
that required any unmarried minor seeking an abortion to have the
consent of her parents or, if her parents denied consent, of a judge.
Bill Baird, who operated a Boston abortion clinic, 3 filed an action
claiming the statute violated the equal protection clause. A group of
parents intervened in favor of the statute. A three-judge district court
held a three-day hearing and, with one dissent, found the law unconstitutional, but the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court for an "authoritative construction"
3. Baird had also operated the first abortion and birth control clinic in the country, and he
may be remembered as the defendant in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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of the statute.4 After receiving that construction, the federal district
court held a second brief trial and again found the law unconstitutional. During that proceeding, a coalition including the Planned
Parenthood League of Massachusetts was allowed to intervene as a
plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's result with
only one dissent, but it split 4-4 over its reasons. 5 Justice Powell's
opinion for one bloc advised states that they may require parental consent to a minor's abortion if the minor can, without notifying her parents, seek a judicial finding that an abortion is in her best interests or
that she is "mature" enough to decide for herself whether to have an
abortion. The Massachusetts legislature passed such a statute, and,
after nearly seven years of litigation, it went into effect.
Professor Mnookin reports that hearings under the statute are
prompt, brief, and informal. But his most striking conclusion is that
''[e]very pregnant minor who has sought judicial authorization for an
abortion has secured an abortion" (p. 239; emphasis in original). In
the statute's first two years, some 1300 girls sought such authorization.
Ninety percent of them were found mature enough to decide for themselves to have an abortion; an abortion was found to be in the best
interests of ten percent; and five girls were originally denied an abortion, of whom four were granted one on appeal and one had her abortion in another state. Whether more teenagers benefit or suffer
because of the statute is a question Professor Mnookin discusses
searchingly but believes cannot be answered.
The third study is of Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and
Hospital 6 and is by Professor Robert Burt, of the Yale Law School.
Pennhurst is a Pennsylvania state institution for the retarded. In the
1960s Pennsylvania began to "deinstitutionalize," but by 1974, 1400
people still lived in Pennhurst in "hellish" conditions. Winifred Halderman, the mother of one of its residents, brought suit seeking both
institutional improvements and monetary damages against state officials. In 1975, the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens intervened as a plaintiff, and in 1976 it asked that Pennhurst be closed
and its inmates transferred to small residences. In 1976, a federal district court held a thirty-two-day trial and heard eighty witnesses, including experts, parents of Pennhurst residents, former Pennhurst
residents, and Pennhurst staff. In 1977, the court ordered Pennhurst
closed, saying that "all the parties in this litigation" had agreed that
Pennhurst residents "should be living in the community."? In 1979,
the Third Circuit affirmed; in 1981, the Supreme Court reversed; in
1982, the Third Circuit reaffirmed on different grounds; and in 1984,
4.
5.
6.
7.

Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
446 F. Supp. at 1312.
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the Supreme Court again reversed. Later in 1984, the state agreed to
close Pennhurst by July 1, 1986. In the meantime, however, a group
of parents of Pennhurst residents had asked the court not to close
Pennhurst, and they won a ruling that no one could be removed from
Pennhurst without a hearing. These parents did not join in the settlement reached in 1984.
The consequences of Pennhurst are unclear, since the settlement
was agreed upon while the book was in production. However, Professor Burt describes a common element "in the relations among all the
Pennhurst parties: [a progression] from initial efforts to find common
ground by overlooking potential conflicts to ultimate discord and recrimination" (p. 289). Mrs. Halderman and her lawyer eventually disagreed about which of them spoke for Terri Lee, the Pennhurst
parents eventually disagreed about whether Pennhurst should be
closed, the experts eventually disagreed about deinstitutionalization,
and the plaintiffs and defendants eventually disagreed about how
Pennhurst should be administered. Professor Burt argues that the
basic question for our inquiry is whether litigation can be conducted in
ways that at least do not feed this [erosion of mutuality]; and whether, at
best, litigation might interrupt and redirect this impetus in order to build
a firmer communal foundation from the evident impulse among all parties toward initial mutual support .... [pp. 324-25]

The fourth case study is of Roe v. Norton 8 and is by Professor Stephen D. Sugarman, of the University of California at Berkeley School
of Law. In 1971, responding to its own inclinations and to pressure
from the federal government, Connecticut passed a statute threatening
with jail for contempt of court any mother receiving Aid to Families
with Dependent Children who refused to identify the father of any of
her children who were AFDC beneficiaries. Two legal-aid lawyers
had clients who wished not to provide that information, and cases they
filed were consolidated before a three-judge district court. The court,
sua sponte, appointed a former legal-aid lawyer to represent the class
of children of such mothers. In 1973, after a one-day trial, the court
upheld the statute. On appeal, the American Civil Liberties Union,
the Children's Defense Fund, and the Welfare Law Center contributed
amicus briefs. However, the Supreme Court remanded for reconsideration in light of new federal legislation withholding benefits from uncooperative mothers. In 1975, that legislation was amended to excuse
mothers who had "good cause for refusing to cooperate ... in accordance with standards prescribed by [HEW], which standards shall take
into consideration the best interests of the child ... " (p. 418). HEW's
standards were not proposed until August 1976 and were not final un8. Doe v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. 65 (D. Conn. 1973), vacated sub nom. Roe v. Norton, 422
U.S. 391 (1975), on remand sub nom. Doe v. Maher, 414 F. Supp. 1368 (D. Conn. 1976), vacated,
432 U.S. 526 (1977).

I
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til December 1978, after long lobbying and legislative and administrative debate.
Professor Sugarman concludes that "[t]he rules governing coerced
maternal cooperation in Connecticut today resemble those before
1969" (p. 429). The class of exceptions is narrow. True, "[t]he exceptions are more clearly spelled out today than in 1968 and only the
mother's share of AFDC is at risk." Yet Professor Sugarman believes
"these differences are largely irrelevant in practice" (p. 429). He argues that we cannot tell whether more children are helped than hurt
by these standards.
The final study is of Goss v. Lopez 9 and is by Professor Franklin E.
Zimring, then of the University of Chicago Law School, and Mr. Rayman L. Solomon, of the American Bar Foundation. In 1971, after
racial disturbances, a number of black students in Columbus, Ohio,
were suspended from school without a hearing. At the instance of the
local NAACP, and with the help of a federally funded Center for Law
and Education, a suit was filed challenging the Ohio statute that permitted suspensions without a hearing. In 1972, after a one-day trial, a
three-judge district court held the su'spensions unconstitutional.
Although the Columbus school board had meanwhile instituted procedures close to those ordered by the district court, the defendants appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed by a five-to-four vote, but it held
only that "students facing suspension [for ten days or fewer] and the
consequent interference with a protected property interest must be
given some kind of notice and afforded some kind of hearing." 10
Professor Zimring and Mr. Solomon argue that the consequences
of Goss have been much exaggerated: The due process now required
for short-term suspension is hardly more than a conversation between
administrator and student and is thus hardly more than commonly
existed before Goss. They contend that, if school life has become "legalized," the change has primarily to do with mainstreaming and desegregation and the judicial participation in school affairs those
reforms have brought.
The Final Observations

Professor Mnookin concludes In the Interest of Children with some
brief but probing final observations. He sees the case studies as raising
the question of how power over children's lives should be allocated
among children, parents, and the various branches of government.
More particularly, the cases dealt "primarily with the needs of poor
children, minority children, and children with special handicaps" (p.
514). He proposes that "the dilemma of legitimacy ... is perhaps less
9. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
10. 419 U.S. at 579 (emphasis in original).
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troublesome when courts intervene on behalf of children with extraordinary needs" (p. 514), since such children both need more from
the state and are less likely to have parents politically able to help
them get it. Nevertheless, the prediction and value problems remain,
and - exactly because such children and their parents lack power the problem of the advocate's accountability is intensified.
Turning to the judicial role, Professor Mnookin finds that "the litigation process is not always a deliberative, methodical, rational way of
arriving at a decision" (p. 517), and he reminds us that the choice of
the judicial forum shapes the way a policy question is framed, the influence of the possible actors, and the nature of the answer. However,
he observes that, in these five cases, courts often looked for compromises or for ways of transmuting substantive disputes into due process solutions. "In sum these studies suggest that the courts have been
very modest in what they are willing to do" (p. 521). They are neither
the imperial judiciary of their critics' fears nor the bold reformers of
their enthusiasts' hopes.

II. How

WELL DOES THE BOOK SAY IT?

One feature of legal scholarship as irritating as any other is its
long-standing, long-deplored resistance to investigating how legal doctrine is actually formulated and to studying empirically the consequences of legal doctrines. Happily, in family law, such a literature has
begun to develop, as variously exemplified by Barbara Nelson's Making an Issue of Child Abuse, Jeanne Giovannoni and Rosina Becerra's
Defining Child Abuse, Gilbert Steiner's The Futility of Family Policy,
Kristin Luker's Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood, and David
Chambers' Making Fathers Pay. In the Interest of Children is a welcome and estimable addition to that literature from some of family
law's most distinguished students.
The book's successes are manifest and manifold. At the simplest
level, it tells good stories. (The intricate unfoldings of Smith v. OFFER and of Bellotti v. Baird are limned with special craft and grace.)
More significantly, the book serves well its original purpose of investigating how "child advocates" function. (Professors Wald and Chambers have especially thoughtful things to say about the ethical and
practical problems of lawyers who represent children in test cases.)
Absorbing as such lawyers will find In the Interest of Children, a general audience will find much to admire as well. The book sets each
case in a social and a legal context, so that we may see why it developed and how it looked to the litigators and the judges. (Professor
Zimring and Mr. Solomon's exposition of the social context of Goss v.
Lopez is particularly illuminating.) The authors are sensitive to the
ways courts interact with legislatures and bureaucracies. (Professor
Mnookin and Professor Sugarman provide notably enlightening de-
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scriptions of how social policy emerged from diverse·political institutions.) The book examines the actual consequences of the holdings in
the cases, and in virtually every instance those examinations are startling and provocative. Finally, Professor Mnookin's lucid and insightful introductory analysis and concluding observations provide the
kind of broad-ranging view of family law problems that the literature
so much needs. 11
All this being so, it seems churlish to ask for more. But since I
hope this book will inspire imitation, I must mention a few disappointments with it. The authors are flatly uninformative about method.
Much of their information obviously came from interviews, but we
never learn who was interviewed or how, what questions were asked,
or what the relationships were between the authors (about whom
nothing can be discovered from the book) and the people they studied.
We are told virtually nothing about how the cases studied were selected, about their typicality, pr about kinds of public interest litigation involving children which are not represented in the book. Indeed,
"test-case litigation to promote the welfare of children" may not be an
entirely usual, or even useful, category. Certainly each of these cases
might readily be categorized differently: OFFER as an administrative
hearings case, Bellotti as an abortion case, Pennhurst as a large-institutions or handicapped's rights case, Norton as a welfare-rights case, and
Goss as a race or school case. And, although a large literature has
grown up relating to a number of the book's topics - public interest
litigation, institutional litigation, class actions, due process fetishism,
foster-care programs, deinstitutionalization, and so on - little of it is
discussed. Perhaps the most disappointing aspect of the book is its
reluctance to generalize from the cases. Considering the length of the
book, this reluctance is quite understandable. Nevertheless, the reader
is left anxious to know more about what the authors make of the case
studies as a whole. Professor Mnookin's final observations are sensible
and sensitive, but they make hungry where most they satisfy. In the
rest of this review, then, I will proffer some speculations the book
might stimulate - recognizing, of course, that any conclusions based
on only five cases must be tentative, but also recognizing that the proverbial journey begins with a single step.

III.

WHAT

CAN

WE MAKE OF WHAT THE BOOK SAYS?

In the Interest of Children is about how well and how legitimately
family law policy can be made through constitutional "test-case" litigation. As Professor Mnookin observes, both judicial success and judicial legitimacy depend on judicial capacity to identify standards for
11. See Schneider, The Next Step: Definition, Generalization, and Theory in American Fam·
ily Law, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1039 (1985), for an argument that such studies have not been, but
should be, written.
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measuring the "best interests" of children and to apply those standards to particular cases. In constitutional litigation, these questions
of capacity depend on the clarity of the constitutional text, on the litigants• ability to identify and articulate their own interests and thereby
provide the court information it needs with which to make policy, and
on the court's ability to analyze and remedy the problems a case raises.
In the Interest of Children raises doubts about each of these three
factors.
The first factor - the clarity of the constitutional text - is important as one method of resolving what Professor Mnookin calls the
"value problem,'' the problem of deciding what criteria should be used
in choosing between policies for children. In this respect, the cases
described in In the Interest of Children may usefully be compared with
Brown v. Board of Education. However many complexities the Court
may subsequently have encountered in its school-desegregation
travails, it was guided in Brown by a constitutional provision widely
understood to make a basic moral and social statement about government and race. While that statement could be implemented in many
ways, its importance, strength, and (relative) simplicity gave unity and
direction to the Court's labors. None of the authors of In the Interest
of Children, on the other hand, really suggests that genuine guidance
can be inferred from the various texts that have been thought relevant
to children's issues, and even Professor Mnookin's intimation that
children might be a "discrete and insular minority" (pp. 41-42) seems
half-hearted and perhaps not intended to convince. In any event, since
much has been written before about these controversies, little need be
said here.
As to the other questions of judicial capacity, however, the book
provides evidence from which some generalizations might be inferred,
particularly about the interaction of what Professor Mnookin calls the
"prediction problem" - the difficulty of predicting the consequences
of alternative children's policies - with questions of judicial capacity
and legitimacy. Each of the book's authors stresses the complexity of
the social problems at issue in each case. Each author demonstrates
tellingly what is therefore hardly surprising - that systematic empirical information and skill in analyzing it are needed for understanding
the social problems each case concerned. Each author also demonstrates that the complexity of these problems, obvious as it seems, is
either unperceived or disregarded by the makers of judicial family policy. What inferences can be drawn, then, from In the Interest of Children about the success and legitimacy of test-case litigation in light of
the fact that lawyers and judges need this kind of information and
skill?

Michigan Law Review
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The Independence of the "Child Advocate"

Judges learn about the social problems a case presents primarily
from the lawyers who argue it. Judges depend on lawyers to identify
accurately the interests of their clients and to relate fully the information that supports the policies that are in the interests of those clients.
Lawyers, in turn, depend on their clients, whom we expect to know
their own situations and to bear the consequences of ignorance. And
ordinarily lawyers are constrained, if not controlled, by their clients:
they need clients before they can bring suit, they are ethically required
to serve the client's interest as the client understands it, they learn
about the client's problems through the client, and if the client wishes
to settle the case, the lawyer is obliged to oblige. But in test-case litigation involving children, it is exactly the problem that children cannot speak for themselves. (Indeed, it is the fact that children lack a
voice in government that, in the minds of many of its practitioners,
justifies such litigation.) Thus what is perhaps most striking about the
litigation described in In the Interest of Children is that, in each case,
lawyers were in a meaningful sense not constrained by clients: the
hand was the hand of the client, but the voice was the voice of the
lawyer.
What is the nature of this independence? How does it affect the
choice of interests and policies to be urged on the judge? How does it
affect the provision of information to the judge? To these questions we
now turn.
The "child advocates' " independence of their clients in test-case
litigation has, as In the Interest of Children reveals, many sources.
The first of these sources is one Professor Mnookin emphasizes: the
clients are children and therefore cannot make decisions or speak for
themselves. Children's decisions are usually made by their parents,
and thus children's lawyers are ordinarily instructed by children's parents. But in cases like OFFER, Bellotti, Norton, and, as it developed,
even Pennhurst, the question whether the parent was serving the
child's interest was itself at issue. Furthermore, even where, as in OFFER and Norton, lawyers represented adults, those adults often did
not control the lawyer: Not only did someone other than the client
pay the lawyer, but the named clients in each case except Pennhurst
dropped out of the case fairly early, their individual problems having
been solved. Indeed, some named clients were hardly in the case at all,
since, as happened most conspicuously in OFFER and most questionably in Bellotti (pp. 172-73), they were recruited by the lawyers expressly to allow the lawyers to represent particular points of view.
The lawyers described in In the Interest of Children were, then,
generally not controlled by named clients. The lawyers' freedom was
enhanced by the facts that, in each case, at least some of the lawyers
represented either a class or a group of clients and that, in each case,
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the interests of the members of the class conflicted. (Even in Pennhurst, where the parents had formed an unusually active and sophisticated association, some parents eventually moved to intervene to
oppose the association's attempt to close the institution.) The diversity of the class' interests helped free the lawyers to pick for themselves the interests to be urged upon the court. Thus, for instance, one
lawyer in OFFER declined even to meet her named clients on the
ground that "it would be a 'trap' to become embroiled in arguing
about the fates of a few children when the real issues at stake were so
much broader" (p. 93).
Similar problems with the lawyers' role appear in many, perhaps
most, kinds of public interest litigation. Often, however, such litigation is paid for and controlled by organizations whose members are
themselves members of the group whose ill treatment the lawyers hope
to correct. Those interest groups may have some ability to instruct
and supervise their lawyers. Even such groups, of course, can have
real difficulties overseeing lawyers, partly because lawyers sometimes
claim exclusive expertise in deciding whether and how to litigate. 12
But what is striking about the lawyers described in In the Interest of
Children is that so many of them initiated suits and conducted litigation quite without genuine supervision from their organizational
clients.
In short, in each of the cases studied at least one of the lawyers
operated quite independently. In OFFER, Norton, Goss, and Bellotti,
clients neither employed nor supervised lawyers. In Pennhurst the client - the parents' organization - does appear to have supervised its
lawyers, but its decisions provoked some of the parents to oppose the
original suit. And Pennhurst provides one of the most disturbing examples of the problems of deciding for whom a lawyer speaks. Pennhurst had begun when Mrs. Halderman, concerned about her severely
retarded daughter's treatment at Pennhurst, hired a lawyer who filed
suit on behalf of "Terri Lee Halderman, a retarded citizen, by her
mother and guardian, Winifred Halderman" (p. 284). Later, however,
the lawyer announced that his client was Terri Lee and that he would
not accept instruction from Mrs. Halderman, on the grounds that parents and institutionalized children have inherently conflicting interests
(p. 286).
If these lawyers are often neither instructed by their clients nor
supervised by their employers, how do they decide what the public
interest is and what policies to advocate for children? In the Interest
of Children says little about this question, possibly because the lawyers
themselves seem hardly to have considered it. One would suppose
12. For an illuminating discussion of how inferest groups decided to participate as amici in
Bakke and of the influence of lawyers over those groups, see T. O'NEILL, BAKKE AND THE
POLITICS OF EQUALITY (1985) (reviewed in this issue).
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(and the book sometimes intimates) that lawyers' policy preferences
are drawn from their experiences with other clients and opponents,
informed by their ideological opinions and their law school training.
But given the inexperience of many of these lawyers, given the inescapable narrowness of their training, given the lawyer's necessarily
limited perspective on a client's problems, and given the prejudice
with which lawyers come to view their opponents' positions, the lawyer's experience seems a disconcerting basis for making policy choices
in so complex an area as family law. Nevertheless, the lawyers who
were asked seemed sanguine about relying on it. One of the NYCLU's
lawyers in OFFER, for example, thought that children's rights litigation does not "raise such sophisticated issues that you need development experts" (p. 136). And none of the lawyers in that difficult case
"saw any need for expert advice for guidance regarding the positions
to advance" (p. 133).
The independence of the child's advocate from the child and even
from those who hire him raises, then, two kinds of questions. First,
how well can the child advocate inform courts? Second, how does the
child advocate's independence affect the legitimacy of judicial decisions that purport to evaluate the constitutional adequacy of a legislative policy or to compensate for the child's nonrepresentation in the
elected branches of government? The seriousness of these questions
will depend in part on the capacity of courts to understand and solve
problems of public policy for children, and we will now ask what light
In the Interest of Children sheds on that capacity.
B.

The Capacity of Courts

However troubling it is that lawyers who are freed to formulate
positions on public policy seem ill-suited to do so, the adversary process and judicial insight might nevertheless flush out all that judges
need to know to make wise policy. In the Interest of Children, however, suggests reasons to doubt that this happens. We begin with the
set of reasons that has to do with a court's ability to collect and interpret information in test-case litigation.
The first kind of problem in this respect was that these proceedings
too often lacked the virtues and yet had the faults of an adversary
system of justice. For example, an adversary system depends on a
rough equality between the lawyers for each side. But in each of these
cases, the government's lawyers seem to have been badly outmatched:
The public interest lawyers tended to come from better law Schools
and to have greater resources - money, time, research services, and
the like - than their opponents. Thus, the state's position often seems
to have been, relatively, weakly presented. An adversary system, particularly one relied on to formulate social policy in a large and baffling
area, also depends on some genuine adverseness between the parties to
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generate evidence and sharpen argument. In these cases, however, the
evidence presented to the courts was limited by the fact that, at some
point in each of the cases, the parties had only slight differences. In
Goss, for instance, the school committee early in the litigation adopted
disciplinary procedures somewhat more favorable than those the
Supreme Court eventually ordered, and throughout the litigation the
defendants "perceived the case as having only one issue: did Ohio law
grant them autonomy in maintaining discipline in the schools?" (p.
473). The defendants (and concomitantly the plaintiffs) therefore introduced virtually no evidence to the court. Even in Pennhurst, the
defendants said they wanted and intended to do what the plaintiffs
asked - close the institution. Consequently, "there was virtually no _
controversy about institutional closure until some considerable time
after the trial had ended" (p. 273).
Not only were some of the adversary system's advantages for collecting information absent in these cases, but some of its impediments
were present. In each case, for example, the lawyers seem not to have
believed that representing the public interest obliged them to depart
from the usual practice of exploiting every ethical litigational advantage. Thus lawyers for children opposed the appointment of additional lawyers who might have represented more fully the interests of
all the children in the class (p. 141), attempted to limit the witnesses
and issues presented to courts (p. 141), and used technicalities to prevent a case from being heard on appeal (p. 378).
This brings us to the second kind of limit on the court's ability to
collect information in test-case litigation involving children: The hearing in each of the cases was stunningly inadequate. In none of the
cases was there a genuine trial of the major issues at stake; except for
Pennhurst, hearings lasted from only one to three days. This brevity
was sometimes commanded by the court 13 and sometimes caused by
the parties. In either event, the court learned little about the named
parties, the class, the immediate problem, or the larger social issues.
Much of the evidence presented related to the named plaintiffs, partly
for tactical reasons and partly, one suspects, because that is what lawyers customarily do. Yet in test-case litigation, anecdotes about a few
individuals can rarely be enlightening and are often misleading. And
little though the trial judges could have learned from these hearings,
the appellate judges who finally decided those cases surely learned
even less, since it is unlikely that they read the full trial record.
The third limit on the judicial capacity to collect information is
that to ask lawyers in "social policy" cases to be genuinely and thor13. One reason the hearings were brief was apparently that each case except Pennhurst was
originally heard by a three-judge federal district court, an institution whose clumsiness and composition may deter prolonged trials. The virtual abolition of that institution may have eliminated
one cause of perfunctory hearings.
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oughly illuminating is to ask a great deal. Each author of In the Interest of Children devastatingly shows the inadequacy of the social
information presented in these cases. To some extent, systematic evidence was simply unavailable. To a considerable extent, the lawyers
failed to grasp the relevance of what was available or to use experts to
inform themselves and the court. Where systematic evidence was
available and where lawyers tried to use it, its complexity and ambiguity prevented lawyers from effectively gathering, analyzing, and
presenting it, and courts from assimilating it. 14
Judicial understanding of the social problems presented by testcase litigation for children seems, then, to be hampered by severe
problems in acquiring information and ideas. These problems are simultaneously exacerbated and eased (or evaded) by a set of judicial
(and lawyer's) attitudes that might be called hyper-rationalism.
Hyper-rationalism is essentially the substitution of reason for information and analysis. It has two components: first, the belief that
reason can reliably be used to infer facts where evidence is unavailable
or incomplete, and second, the practice of interpreting facts through a
set of artificial analytic categories. The first component of hyperrationalism has three related aspects. In its first aspect, it is the assumption that systematic evidence is generally superfluous to understanding social problems, since the behavior of people and institutions
can be logically inferred from a general understanding of how people
and institutions work. 15 In its second aspect, it is the assumption that,
in the absence of a general understanding of how people and institutions work, anecdotal evidence is generally sufficient, since the behavior of people and institutions can be logically inferred from a few
14. Much of Professor Mashaw's work is to 'a similar point. Consider his discussion of the
Supreme Court's treatment of procedural due process:
An attempt to address the cost-benefit question in a relatively rigorous fashion has demonstrated our (and any reviewing court's) inability to obtain the necessary data to refute that
presumption [of administrative regularity] convincingly. Analysis •.. must proceed on the
basis of rough judgments, assumptions, and case comparisons. And, if the post-Eldridge
Supreme Court cases are any guide, those approaches have produced dramatic variance in
judicial judgments and a nearly incomprehensible jurisprudence. The Court in Eldridge,
ignorant of the facts, affirms the legislative-administrative judgment. Its only alternative
seems to be the Goldberg approach-an approach that, similarly uninformed, merely affirms
a different, more interventionist, vision of the judicial function.
J. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 134-35 (1985).
15. Professor Donald Horowitz describes one version of this aspect of hyper-rationalism in
his important The Courts and Social Policy, where he talks of
deriv[ing] behavioral expectations from what might be called the logical structure of incen·
tives.... [C]ourts may consciously formulate rules of law calculated to appeal to the interests of "legal man" in rather the same way as the marketplace is thought to appeal to the
interests of "economic man." . . . The problem with this, of course, is that it is deductive
rather than empirical. There is no assurance that the judge has correctly formulated 'the
structure of incentives: his logic and the logic of the actors affected by rules of law !hay
begin from different premises.
D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 49 (1977).
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examples of their actual behavior under the relevant circumstances. 16
In its third aspect, it is the assumption that a description of social
reality articulated. in one case may be taken as demonstrated fact in
subsequent cases; it is, in other words, the application of stare decisis
to evidence about social behavior. 17
All three attitudes recurred in the cases described in In the Interest
of Children and are manifest in the evidence presented to and recited
by the judges. 18 These attitudes are not, of course, uniquely judicial;
they are probably common among public officials, who must formulate
policy quickly and who are often temperamentally disinclined to learn
about an issue through systematic reading. However, these attitudes
are more problematic when held by judges, who lack the general administrative experience and the particular subject-matter expertise
that officials can use in interpreting sketchy information and who are
ill-situated to revise a policy as experience with it teaches new lessons.
The second component of hyper-rationalism is the practice of analyzing social problems in terms of a small set oflegal categories. Legal
categories are troublesome and necessary for the same reason - they
are a limited set of abstractions from social reality. Legal categories
may be specially awkward when the law makes policy for families,
since many of the values of family life are notoriously nonlegal and
extra-rational. But even aside from this difficulty, drawbacks of analyzing a social problem in terms .of the legal categories available
abound in In the Interest of Chilqren. For instance, judicial policymaking was repeatedly impaired by the fact that each of the five
cases concerned (and the plaintiffs' lawyers and many of the judges
were primarily interested in) a perplexing social problem, but the legal
issue the cases presented was rarely an apt means of addressing that
problem: The legal issue often spoke only indirectly to the social problem; to resolve the legal issue in a way that contributed to resolving
the social problem often would have required a remedy far beyond
judicial authority; and to define the legal issue so as to give a court
scope in solving the social problem often risked creating legal doctrines with unanticipated and unwanted consequences. This point is
16. This attitude also helps explain judicial willingness to accept as "proof" the conclusions
of one or a few social science studies. Cf. id. at 274-84.
17. Professor Mashaw neatly describes this third attitude:
As precedent accretes, and as it is manipulated without reference to the particular circumstances from which it emerged, judicial activity may become increasingly insular. Rather
than pursuing empirical inquiry into the social world, the legal culture may take on a life of
its own-one in which cases stand for social facts and manipulation of formal categories
replaces factual inquiry as the basis for decision making.
J. MASHAW, supra note 14, at 59 (footnote omitted).
18. I discuss this attitude toward evidence in a different context in Schneider, Free Speech
and Corporate Freedom: A Comment on First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 59 S. CAL. L.
REV. (forthcoming). See also Nagel, How Useful is Judicial Review in Free Speech Cases?, 69
CORNELL L. REV. 302 (1984).
'
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made with particular clarity by Professors Wald and Chambers in
their discussion of OFFER, but it was or could have been made by
each of the authors. Bellotti is centrally about the dilemmas of adolescent pregnancy; Pennhurst about the best ways of treating the extraordinarily various handicaps of the retarded; Norton about how the
interests of mothers and children receiving welfare can be reconciled
and served; Goss about how schools should handle the difficulties
caused by integration and by changes in social attitudes towards discipline and education. Yet the legal issue in each case was defined in
terms of (usually procedural, sometimes substantive) due process, and
each case was in part resolved by a provision for some kind of hearing.
Due process devices were prominent in these cases not only because due process is the most convenient and plausible category for
judicially addressing problems of family policy; due process also allows judges to hope that the social complexity which escapes their immediate understanding and reach will be taken into account in the
newly revised process of decision. Yet, on the evidence of these cases,
that hope seems unfounded. Few foster parents have used the hearing
assured by OFFER; virtually every girl who sought judicial authorization for an abortion after Bellotti rebeived it; hardly any mothers have
fully pursued the procedural rights they secured in the process of
which Norton was a part, and Professor Sugarman questions whether
the fight over the Norton regulations "has made any important difference" (p. 429); and Professor Zimring and Mr. Solomon conclude that
"what many commentators have called 'proceduralism' did students
very little good but even less palpable harm" (p. 505). These results
accord with Dean Yudof's conclusion that "[e]xperience with recent
federal acts creating procedural rights for parents suggests that few
take advantage of these statutory rights" 19 and with Professor
Mashaw's observation that "[t]he Goldberg requirement of extensive
pretermination hearings has not produced a huge, or even very substantial, increase in the number of hearings held." 20
The difficulties presented by both components of judicial hyperrationalism can be seen by examining another common feature of
these cases. Each case, with the possible exception of Bellotti, has centrally to do with a bureaucracy. In each case, a court was asked to
make a bureaucracy work "better." Few judges are equipped by training, experience, or temperament to understand bureaucracies. Nevertheless, their hyper-rationalism allows them to believe that their
experience with conducting or evaluating trials makes them expert in
governmental procedure of all kinds.
The quality of bureaucratic work depends on the characteristics of
19. Yudof, Legalization ofDispute Resolution, Distrust ofAuthority, and Organizational The·
ory: lmpleme11ti11g Due Process for Students in the Public Schools, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 891, 906.
20. J. MASHAW, supra note 14, at 251.
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the particular bureaucracy, of its staff, and of its leaders. But because
judges believe they can understand how all bureaucracies work
through a priori reasoning, they resist inquiring into the individual
character of a bureaucracy. Further, because judges are bound to use a
limited number of legal categories in dealing with bureaucracies, it is
hard for judges to interpret the law in a way that allows for variations
between bureaucracies and within a single bureaucracy over time. The
upshot of this, as we have just seen, is that judges try to improve bureaucracies by imposing on them procedures that are, at best, pro
forma or unused. The judicial cure for the ills of bureaucracy is more
bureaucracy.
Not only does hyper-rationalism lead courts to impose on bureaucracies and their clients procedures which are, like the hearings described above, unused or meaningless. It also allows courts to
underestimate greatly both the difficulties of persuading a bureaucracy
to act in the way a court wishes and the resourcefulness of recusant
bureaucrats. In other words, because courts substitute anecdote for
evidence and legal categories for social analysis, they do not ask why
bureaucrats think and act as they do. And because courts do not understand the assumptions of and pressures on bureaucrats, courts are
ill-fitted to win their cooperation (and, because of the paucity of judicial remedies and the scarcity of judicial time, ill-equipped to coerce
it).
OFFER exemplifies many of these features of the hyper-rational
approach to bureaucracies. In that case, the social problem was to
ensure that foster children are wisely treated, and thus a central question was whether hearings would improve the bureaucracy's decisions.
That question was to be answered for the whole country on the pasis
of evidence about only two bureaucracies and of a small set of legal
assumptions about how hearings generally affect bureaucratic decisions. But it depends on an almost endless number of considerations,
many of which will vary from one bureaucracy to another and within
a single bureaucracy over time. Will a hearing officer make a better
decision than a case worker? Can anything systematic be learned
about the comparative sensitivity, training, experience, energy, or
judgment of those two bureaucrats? Is the hearing officer a worn-out
caseworker or a caseworker whose ability has been rewarded by promotion? Is a caseworker's personal acquaintance with the people involved a help or a hindrance? How important is speed in making a
decision? How will hearings affect the morale of caseworkers? Their
attitudes toward their clients? Their willingness to take necessary
risks? Will the prospect of hearings encourage the caseworker to think
more carefully, or merely to avoid making reviewable decisions? To
follow rules more faithfully, or to doctor the paper record? Will hearings lead to the formulation of clearer standards for the removal of
children? Are clearer standards better standards, or is it preferable to
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use vaguer standards that preserve a measure of discretion? Is the cost
of hearings worth the price? Would the money have been better spent
hiring another caseworker? Hiring another supervisor? Improving
training programs? Improving record-keeping? Raising salaries to attract abler caseworkers? Does the usefulness of hearings vary with the
size of the bureaucracy? Will hearings affect a bureaucracy's ability to
recruit and retain foster parents? Its ability to persuade natural parents to put children in foster care? And so on and on.
In these two sections, we have been examining how judicial understanding of public policy affecting children may be limited by judicial
problems in acquiring and analyzing evidence. We have seen that for
structural and attitudinal reasons, judges are exposed to only a fraction of the information that they need and that they rely on an analytic
framework which is often incomplete and ill-fitting. An obvious
source of both information and analysis is the social sciences, and
these cases often do indicate that the social sciences need to be better
used. But I am not arguing that courts should simply shift the burden
of decision onto the social sciences. For familiar and understandable
reasons, social science evidence is too incomplete, social science theory
is too fragile, and social science value choices are too problematic to
justify such a tactic.21
Nor does my criticism of the incompleteness of the information,
analysis, and remedies in these cases imply that the only good policy is
a global one, one that tries conclusively to understand and final1y to
solve the whole problem all at once. On the contrary, there is much to
be said for incrementalism, for what Professor Lindblom, in a famous
article, called "the science of muddling through. " 22 Because incrementalism is a relatively cautious and modest approach to social policy, it seems plausible that courts might be able to make workable
contributions to child welfare through incremental changes in policy.
But even an incrementalist approach ought to be informed by the best
available evidence and the most appropriate analytic framework. It is
the apparent failure to achieve that level of understanding that raises
questions about whether, even used incrementally, "test-case litigation
[is] a sensible way to promote the welfare of children."
Incrementalism is less promising a method of judicial child welfare
reform than it might first seem for another reason. Incrementalism
requires flexibility and a close and constant attention to the problem
being addressed, so that changes can be made as successes and failures
emerge. In some ways, courts seem well suited to those requirements. ·
Indeed, the traditional explanation of common law development
neatly fits the incrementalist model. That explanation sees courts as
deciding a long series of cases each dealing with a small part of a social
21. See, as one example of many, c. LINDBLOM & D. COHEN, USABLE KNOWLEDGE (1979).
22. Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through," 19 PUB. Ao. REV. 79 (1959).
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problem. From the series of holdings courts gradually induce a principle which is itself susceptible to gradual change as further holdings are
assimilated.
As a description of how courts. act:ually decide cases, this theory
obviously has many deficiencies; but it 11).ay help direct us toward two
impediments to successful incrementalism in test-case litigation over
children's policy. First, such litigation is constitutional, not common
law, litigation, and as such it tends to be deductive, not inductive. The
Constitution provides not only a text to apply, but embodies principles
of importance. This makes it easier for courts to feel they are equipped
to deal with whole problems and not just increments of problems
(since the text and principles presumably pre-empt many of the aspects of a problem that might otherwise be addressed incrementally)
and it makes it harder for courts to respond flexibly (because it is
harder to back down over an issue of principle and because of the need
to maintain consistent application of a principle over the entire range
of assimilable problems). Second, there may simply be too few cases
to generate real familiarity with many of the problems children's policy raises and to allow for frequent small adjustments of policy. F.rom
this point of view, test-case litigation involving numerous enforcement
cases (like Brown) ought, ceteris paribus, to produce better judicial policy than litigation (like OFFER, Bellotti, Norton, and Goss) resolved in
relatively few cases. Similarly, test-case litigation involving institutions (like Pennhurst) ought to produce better judicial policy than
other such reform efforts (again, like OFFER, Bellotti, Norton, and
Goss), at least to the extent that the intensive interaction between court
and institution which is thought to typify institutional litigation forces
the court to learn in detail about the particular entity it seeks to
change. Yet even these instances of better judicial policy (if such they
be) import their own limits: only a greatly expanded judiciary could
afford such attention to more than a very few areas of litigation, and it
is exactly the intensity of judicial involvement that has provoked criticism of the school desegregation and institutional cases.
IV.

CONCLUSION

I have devoted much of this review to what In the Interest of Children suggests about the difficulties judges have in acquiring the information needed to write policy for children and in interpreting the
information they acquire, and I have inferred from the book that those
difficulties may be both systematic and severe. Whether they are disabling, whether they are worse than similar difficulties encountered by
other branches of government, and whether they are curable are not
questions that can be answered here. They are, however, questions not
just of judicial capacity, but also of judicial legitimacy. Judicial policy
ought not be weighed in the same scales as legislative and executive
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policy, for the latter comes with the added legitimacy that democratic
institutions have in a democratic system. Of course the question of
judicial legitimacy in children's test cases can no more be resolved
here than can the question of judicial competence. But it seems to me
a danger that, in our appreciation for the successes of judicial policy
which are symbolized by Brown v. Board of Education, we may forget
its limitations, exaggerate its virtues, and become unduly contemptuous of the democratic branches of government. This danger arises not
so much from the debate over judicial review (a debate which has attracted a good deal of intelligent, careful, and subtle thought) as from
a less-considered but powerful attitude toward courts and legislatures
which seems to underlie a good deal of what is described in In the
Interest of Children and which I believe - and here I am partly relying on my own observations - has worked itself deep into the assumptions and preferences of much of the elite legal community. The
attitude comes in part from the reluctance of lawyers to consider that
some of our enthusiasm for the kind of litigation described in this book
undoubtedly comes from the fact that the "access" to government
such litigation provides is access for us. For, seen in its bleakest light,
In the Interest of Children suggests that that access is offered to a small
group of lawyers unconstrained by the people they purport to be advocates for, by the organizations that employ them, or by clients of any
kind. They come from a group that already has disproportionate ,
power - the upper-middle-class graduates of elite law schools. They
are suspicious of politics. They are at point after point (particularly on
family law issues) resolutely out of sympathy with much of the population. They prefer the rational style of courts to the emotive, demotic
style of politics. In revealing, if surely not characteristic, moments,
one hears them say things like, "No good was ever done by a statute,
since only courts are capable of nuanced decisionmaking." In revealing and less uncharacteristic moments, one sees them decide that
facts about social policy - for instance, about a public institution's
experience with affirmative action programs - ought to be kept secret
because the public cannot properly understand those facts.
Much of the attitude I have described is simply the natural concomitant of devoting oneself to social reform. It is thus logical that, as
Professor Mnookin notes, today's children's advocates often remind
one of their Progressive predecessors. They are similar in class background, similarly suspicious of politics, similarly convinced that political decisions should be transferred to experts, and similarly confident
of their own expertise. The irony of the comparison is that today's
reformers are often attacking the institutions and ideas of the Progressives - in OFFER, the foster care system and its faith in informal
decisions; in Bellotti, moral and social views about adolescent pregnancy; in Pennhurst, the mental hospital; in Norton, restrictions on
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welfare recipients; aoo in Goss, beliefs about the proper relationship
between schools,· children, and the community.
Yet the lessons of modesty and doubt this irony would seem to
teach are widely resisted. This is apparent in the way lawyers in this
kind of litigation call themselves or are called "public interest" lawyers or "advocates for children." The statutes and programs that were
challenged in these cases are surely vulnerable to many criticisms and
may well be wrong. But many, perhaps most, Americans approve of
them exactly in the belief that they serve both the public interest. and
children, and each of the cases is at least ambiguous enough to make
that belief plausible. The ambiguities of OFFER are made amply clear
by Professors Wald and Chambers and by the presence of public interest lawyers and children's advocates on three different fronts. OFFER's ambiguity becomes yet plainer when we recall that foster
parents are, among other things, government employees who, in the
suit, sought to inhibit government supervision of themselves. The statute in Bellotti was in part intended to reduce the number of abortions
that took place in Massachusetts; but its supporters also believed that
pregnant children benefit by discussing their situation with their parents. The statute in Norton was partly meant to save tax money, but
its supporters also thought that fathers should support their children
and that children need that support. The defendants in Goss believed
that informal discipline is better for the children being disciplined and
that it helps administrators protect undisruptive children. Pennhurst
may be an exception. 23 But given the complexity of the problems surrounding asylums of all kinds, given 150 years of unsuccessful struggles to make asylums work and to find alternatives to them, and given
the weakening enthusiasm for the deinstitutionalization movement,24
it is as difficult in Pennhurst as in the other cases confidently to allot to
one side in the dispute exclusive understanding of the public welfare or
unique insight into what children need.
The failure to appreciate the lessons taught by the resemblance to
the Progressives is also notably apparent in Professor Burt's criticism
of the trial judge in Pennhurst. That judge, Professor Burt says, failed
to understand his role as a moral teacher who "forces the defendants
to reconsider their actions by raising the moral costs of those actions. . . . This is a considerable judicial power," Professor Burt
writes, "akin to the force wielded by the greatest moral teachers from
Gandhi to Christ to Socrates: making visible the vulnerability of those
who suffer harm at the hands of wrong-doers" (p. 342). The judge
23. Possibly because it is the only "institutional" case in the book, Pennhurst is the most
frequent exception to the generalizations I have drawn from these case studies.
24. See Richardson, Institutionalization and Deinstitutionalization of Children with Mental
Retardation. in 1 CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH AND SOCIAL POLICY 318 (H. Stevenson &
A. Siegel eds. 1984).

940

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 84:919

should employ that power to teach not only the litigants, but all of
society; he must "reach out even beyond the immediate parties to this
dispute, to show others that they had a stake in the just resolution of
this dispute . . . , even though these others may not previously have
defined themselves as parties to the dispute" (p. 328).
The cautious judge may wish to remind himself what happened to
Gandhi, Christ, and Socrates. He may wish to ask himself what qualities of character, training, or experience equip him to use this kind of
moral force. He may wish to ask himself what consequences this kind
of moral ambition has for most people.
One might recommend many other questions a judge confronted
with Professor Burt's suggestions would want and have to ask. Let me
confine myself, then, to two observations. First, a Gandhi is able to
effect social change only against an opponent who shares basic moral
views with him, and even then only where there is a single, overriding,
and relatively simple moral issue. But the problems discussed with
such richness in In the Interest of Children are exactly not such
problems. They are problems of genuine difficulty, and to think of
them as simple conflicts between the vulnerable and "wrong-doers" is
both unkind to those on the "wrong" side and conducive to the scanting of social complexity that plagues judicial policymaking. My second observation responds to Professor Burt's image of the judge
orchestrating social debate and negotiation over social issues. There is
already a word for what Professor Burt wants the judge to create: the
word is politics.

